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Abstract
This study explores the consequences and origins of between-ethnicity economic inequality
across countries. First, combining satellite images of nighttime luminosity with the historical
homelands of ethnolinguistic groups we construct measures of ethnic inequality for a large sam-
ple of countries. We also compile proxies of overall spatial inequality and regional inequality
across administrative units. Second, we uncover a strong negative association between ethnic
inequality and contemporary comparative development; the correlation is also present when
we condition on regional inequality, which is itself related to under-development. Third, we
investigate the roots of ethnic inequality and establish that diﬀerences in geographic endow-
ments across ethnic homelands explain a sizable fraction of the observed variation in economic
disparities across groups. Fourth, we show that ethnic-specific inequality in geographic en-
dowments is also linked to under-development.
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1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity has costs and benefits. On the one hand, diversity in skills, education, and
endowments can enhance productivity by promoting innovation. On the other hand, diversity is
often associated with poor and ethnically targeted policies, ineﬃcient provision of public goods,
and ethnic-based hatred and conflict. In fact, a large literature finds a negative impact of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation on various aspects of economic performance, with the possible exception
of wealthy economies (see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review). Income inequality may also
have both positive and negative eﬀects on development. On the negative side, a higher degree
of income inequality may lead to conflict and crime, prevent the poor from acquiring educa-
tion, and/or lead to expropriation and lofty taxation discouraging investment. On the positive
side, income inequality may spur innovation and entrepreneurship by motivating individuals and
by providing the necessary pools of capital for capital-intensive modes of production. Further
complicating the relationship between the two, a positive correlation between inequality and de-
velopment may reflect Simon Kuznetz’s conjecture that industrialization translates into higher
levels of inequality at the early stages of development; while at later stages, the association be-
comes negative. Given the theoretical ambiguities (and data issues), perhaps it comes at no
surprise that it has been very hard to detect empirically a robust association between inequality
and development (see Benabou (2005) and Galor (2011) for surveys).
This paper puts forward and tests an alternative conjecture that focuses on the intersection
of ethnic diversity and inequality. Our thesis is that what matters most for comparative devel-
opment are economic diﬀerences between ethnic groups coexisting in the same country, rather
than the degree of fractionalization per se or income inequality conventionally measured (i.e.,
independent of ethnicity).1
The first contribution of this study is to provide measures of within-country diﬀerences in
well-being across ethnic groups, defined as "ethnic inequality." To overcome the sparsity of income
data along ethnic lines and in order to construct country-level indicators of ethnic inequality for
the largest possible set of states, we combine ethnographic and linguistic maps on the location
of groups with satellite images of light density at night which are available at a fine grid. Recent
studies have shown that luminosity is a strong proxy of development (e.g., Henderson, Storeygard,
and Weil (2012)). The cross-ethnic group inequality index is weakly correlated with the commonly
employed —and notoriously poorly measured— income inequality measures at the country level and
is modestly correlated with ethnic fractionalization. To isolate the cross-ethnic component of
1Stewart (2002) and Chua (2003) are early precedents. Providing case-study evidence, they argue that horizon-
tal inequalities across ethnic/religious/racial groups are important features of underdeveloped and conflict-prone
societies. Yet to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few systematic empirical works —if any— that
directly examine this conjecture. We discuss parallel studies that touch upon this issue below.
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inequality from the overall regional inequality, we also construct proxies of spatial inequality and
measures capturing regional diﬀerences in well-being across first and second-level administrative
units.
Second, we document a strong negative association between ethnic inequality and real GDP
per capita across countries. This correlation holds even when we control for the overall degree of
spatial inequality and inequality across administrative regions. The latter is also inversely related
to a country’s economic performance, a novel finding in itself. We also uncover that the negative
correlation between ethnolinguistic fragmentation and development weakens considerably (and
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero) when we account for ethnic inequality; this
suggests that it is the unequal concentration of wealth across ethnic lines that correlates with
development rather than diversity per se.
Third, in an eﬀort to shed light on the roots of ethnic inequality, we explore its geographic
underpinnings. In particular, motivated by recent work showing that linguistic groups tend to
reside in distinct land endowments, see Michalopoulos (2012), we construct Gini coeﬃcients re-
flecting diﬀerences in various geographic attributes across ethnic homelands and show that the
latter is a strong predictor of ethnic inequality. On the contrary, there is no link between con-
temporary ethnic inequality and often-used historical variables capturing the type of colonization
and legal origin among others.
Fourth, we show that contemporary development at the country level is also inversely re-
lated to inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. Yet, once we condition
on between-group income inequality, diﬀerences in geographic endowments are no longer a sig-
nificant correlate of underdevelopment. These results suggest that geographic diﬀerences across
ethnic homelands influence comparative development mostly via shaping economic inequality
across groups.
Mechanisms and Related Works Income disparities along ethnic lines are likely to
lead to political inequality based on ethnic aﬃliation, increase between-group animosity, and lead
to discriminatory policies of one (or more) groups against the others. In line with this idea, in
recent work Huber and Suryanarayan (2013) document that party ethnification in India is more
pronounced in states with a high degree of inequality across sub-castes.2 Furthermore, diﬀerences
2Ethnic inequality may impede development by spurring civil conflict (Horowitz (1985)). However, Esteban and
Ray (2011) show that the eﬀect of ethnic inequality on conflict is ambiguous, as it also depends on within-group
inequality. Recent works in political science provide opposing results. Cederman, Weidman, and Gleditch (2011)
combine proxies of local economic activity from the G-Econ database with ethnolinguistic maps to construct an
index of ethnic inequality for a sub-set of "politically relevant ethnic groups" (as defined by the Ethnic Power
Relations Dataset) and then show that in highly unequal countries, both rich and poor groups fight more often
than those groups whose wealth is closer to the country average. However, in parallel work Huber and Mayoral
(2013) find no link between inequality across ethnic lines and conflict.
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in preferences along both ethnic and income lines may lead to inadequate public goods provision,
as groups’ ideal allocations of resources will be quite distant. Baldwin and Huber (2010) provide
empirical evidence linking between-group inequality to the under-provision of public goods for 46
democracies. In Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2014), we show that there is a strong
inverse link between ethnic inequality and public goods within 18 Sub-Saharan African countries
(and that this eﬀect partly stems from political inequality and ethnic-based discrimination).3
Ethnic inequality may also impede institutional development and the consolidation of democracy
(Robinson (2001)). In line with this conjecture, Kyriacou (2013) exploits survey data from 29
developing countries and shows that socioeconomic ethnic-group inequalities reduce government
quality.
Chua (2003) presents case-study evidence arguing that the presence of an economically
dominant ethnic minority may lower support for democracy and free-market institutions, as the
majority of the population usually feels that the benefits of capitalism go to just a handful of
ethnic groups. She discusses, among others, the influence of Chinese minorities in the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Eastern Asian countries; the dominant role of (small) Lebanese
communities in Western Africa; and the similarly strong influence of Indian societies in Eastern
Africa. Other examples, include the I(g)bo in Nigeria and the Kikuyu in Kenya. Finally, to the
extent that ethnic inequality implies that well-being depends on one’s ethnic identity, then it is
more likely to generate envy and perceptions that the system is "unfair," and reduce interpersonal
trust, more so than the conventionally measured economic inequality, since the latter can be more
easily thought of as the result of ability or eﬀort. Consistent with the view that ethnic inequality
is detrimental to the formation of social ties across groups, Tesei (2014) finds that greater racial
inequality across US metropolitan areas is associated with low levels of social capital.
Organization The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the construc-
tion of the ethnic (and regional) inequality measures and present summary statistics and the
basic correlations. In section 3 we report the results of our analysis associating income per
capita with ethnic inequality across 173 countries. Besides reporting various sensitivity checks,
we also examine the link between development and inequality across administrative regions. In
section 4 we explore the geographic origins of contemporary diﬀerences in economic performance
across groups. In section 5 we report estimates associating contemporary development with in-
equality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. In the last section, we summarize
our findings and discuss avenues for future research.
3Similarly, Deshpande (2000) and Anderson (2011) focus on income inequality across castes in India and asso-
ciate between-caste inequality to public goods provision. See also Loury (2002) for an overview of works studying
the evolution of racial inequality in the US and its implications.
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2 Data
To construct proxies of ethnic inequality for the largest set of countries, we combine information
from ethnographic/linguistic maps on the location of groups with satellite images of light density
at night that are available at a fine grid. In this section, we discuss the construction of the cross-
country measures reflecting inequality in development (as captured by luminosity per capita)
across ethnic homelands within 173 countries. We also describe in detail the construction of the
other measures of spatial inequality and discuss the main patterns.
2.1 Ethnic Inequality Measures
2.1.1 Location of Ethnic Groups
We identify the location of ethnic groups employing two data sets/maps.4 First, we use the Geo-
referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG), which is the digitized version of the Soviet Atlas Narodov
Mira (Weidmann, Rod, and Cederman (2010)). GREG portrays the homelands of 928 ethnic
groups around the world. The information pertains to the early 1960s, so for many countries,
in Africa in particular and to a lesser extent in South-East Asia, it corresponds to the time of
independence.5 The data set uses the political boundaries of 1964 to allocate groups to diﬀerent
countries. We thus project the ethnic homelands to the political boundaries of the 2000 Digital
Chart of the World; this results in 2 129 ethnic homelands within contemporary countries. Most
areas (1 637) are coded as pertaining to a single group, whereas in the remaining 492 homelands,
there can be up to three overlapping groups. For example, in Northeast India over an area of
4 380 2, the Assamese, the Oriyas and the Santals overlap. The luminosity of a region where
multiple groups reside contributes to the average luminosity of each group. The size of ethnic
homelands varies considerably. The smallest polygon occupies an area of 109 km2 (French in
Monaco), and the largest extends over 7 335 476 km2 (American English in the US). The median
(mean) group size is 4 183 (61 213) km2. The median (mean) country in our sample has 8 (115)
ethnicities with the most diverse being Indonesia with 95 groups.
Our second source is the 15th edition of the Ethnologue (Gordon (2005)) that maps 7 581
language-country groups worldwide in the mid/late 1990s, using the political boundaries of 2000.
In spite of the comprehensive linguistic mapping, Ethnologue’s coverage of the Americas and
Australia is rather limited while for others (i.e., Africa and Asia), it is very detailed. Each
polygon delineates a traditional linguistic region; populations away from their homelands (in
4Note that across all units of analysis in the construction of the respective indexes we exclude polygons of less
than 1 square kilometer to minimize measurement error in the drawing of the underlying maps.
5The original Atlas Narodov Mira consists of 57maps. The original sources are: (1) ethnographic and geographic
maps assembled by the Institute of Ethnography at the USSR Academy of Sciences, (2) population census data,
and (3) ethnographic publications of government agencies at the time.
4
cities, refugee camps) are not mapped. Groups of unknown location, as well as widespread and
extinct languages are not mapped either, the only exception is the English in the United States.
Ethnologue also records areas where languages overlap. Ethnologue provides a more refined
linguistic aggregation compared to the GREG. As a result the median (mean) homeland extends
to 726 (12 676) km2. The smallest language is the Domari in Israel which covers 118 km2 and
the largest group is the English in the US covering 7 330 520 km2. The median (mean) country
has 9 (423) groups with Papua New Guinea being the most diverse with 809 linguistic groups.
GREG attempts to map major immigrant groups whereas Ethnologue generally does not.
This is important for countries in the New World. For example, in Argentina GREG reports
16 groups, among them Germans, Italians, and Chileans, whereas Ethnologue reports 20 purely
indigenous groups (e.g., the Toba and the Quechua). For Canada, Ethnologue lists 77 mostly
indigenous groups, like the Blackfoot and the Chipewyan with only English and French being
non-indigenous; in contrast, GREG lists 23 groups featuring many non-indigenous ones, such as
Swedes, Russians, Norwegians, and Germans. Hence, the two ethnolinguistic mappings capture
diﬀerent cleavages, at least in some continents. Though we have performed various sensitivity
checks, for our benchmark results we are including all groups without attempting to make a
distinction as to which cleavage is more salient.6
It is important to note that the underlying maps do include regions where groups overlap
and we take that into account in our measure, as we show below. However, both maps do not
capture relatively recent within-country migrations towards the urban centers, for example. The
reason is that the original sources attempt to trace the historical homeland of each group. Hence,
actual ethnic mixing is likely higher than what the ethnographic maps reflect. This will induce
measurement error to our proxies of ethnic inequality. Nevertheless, under the assumption that
in a given urban center the respective indigenous group is relatively more populous than recent
migrant ones, then assigning the observed luminosity per capita to this group is not entirely ad
hoc. Moreover, there is a large literature documenting that migrant workers channel systemat-
ically a fraction of their earnings back to their homelands. This would imply that although we
do not observe migrant workers in our dataset to the extent that they send remittances to their
families and influence their livelihoods, this will be reflected in the luminosity per capita of the
ancestral homelands which we directly measure. Moreover, to at least partially account for this
issue, we have constructed all inequality measures also excluding the regions where capitals fall.
6A thorough exploration of ethnic inequality across diﬀerent linguistic cleavages is relegated to the Online
Supplementary Appendix.
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2.1.2 Data on Luminosity and Population
Comparable data on income per capita at the ethnicity level are scarce. Hence, following Hen-
derson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) and subsequent studies (e.g., Chen and Nordhaus (2011),
Pinkovskiy (2013), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014), Hodler and Raschky (2014), Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013, 2014)), we use satellite image data on light density at night as a proxy.
These —and other works— show that luminosity is a strong correlate of development at various
levels of aggregation (countries, regions, ethnic homelands). The luminosity data come from the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System that reports images of
the earth at night (from 20:30 till 22:00). The six-bit number that ranges from 0 to 63 is available
approximately at every square kilometer since 1992.
To construct luminosity at the desired level of aggregation, we average all observations
falling within the boundaries of an ethnic group and then divide by the population of each
area using data from the Gridded Population of the World that reports georeferenced pixel-level
population estimates for 1990 and 2000.7
2.1.3 New Ethnic Inequality Measures
We proxy the level of economic development in ethnic homeland  with mean luminosity per
capita, ; and we then construct an ethnic Gini coeﬃcient for each country that reflects inequal-
ity across ethnolinguistic regions. Specifically, the Gini coeﬃcient for a country’s population
consisting of  groups with values of luminosity per capita for the historical homeland of group
, , where  = 1 to  are indexed in non-decreasing order ( ≤ +1), is calculated as follows:
 = 1
µ
+ 1− 2
P
=1(+ 1− )P
=1 
¶
The ethnic Gini index captures diﬀerences in mean income —as captured by luminosity per
capita at the ethnic homeland— across groups. For each of the two diﬀerent ethnic-linguistic maps
(Atlas Narodov Mira and Ethnologue) we construct Gini coeﬃcients for the maximum sample
of countries using cross-ethnic-homeland data in 1992, 2000, and 2012. For each mapping we
construct three ethnic Ginis. First, for our baseline estimates we use information from all groups.
Second, we construct the Gini coeﬃcient dropping the capital cities. This allows us to account
both for extreme values in luminosity and also for population mixing which is naturally higher in
capitals. Third, we compile measures excluding small ethnicities, defined as those representing
less than 1% of the 2000 population in a country.8
7The data is constructed using subnational censuses and other population surveys at various levels (city, neigh-
borhood, region). See for details: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v
In the online Supplementary Appendix, we present various sensitivity checks that examine the role of measure-
ment error both in the population estimates and the luminosity data.
8For example, in Kenya the Atlas Narodov Mira (the Ethnologue) maps 19 (53) ethnic (linguistic) groups. Yet
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2.2 Measures of Spatial Inequality
Since we use ethnic homelands (rather than individual-level) data to measure between-group
inequality, the ethnic inequality measures also reflect regional disparities in income and/or public
goods provision that may not be related to ethnicity per se. To isolate the between-ethnicity
component of inequality from the regional one, we also construct Gini coeﬃcients reflecting (i) the
overall degree of spatial inequality and (ii) inequality across (first and second level) administrative
units for each country. Moreover, in an attempt to assess the accuracy of the underlying groups’
mappings, we perturbed the original homelands and compiled Gini coeﬃcients based on these
altered ethnic homelands.
2.2.1 Overall Spatial Inequality Index
Our baseline index reflecting the overall degree of spatial inequality is based on aggregating (via
the Gini coeﬃcient formula) luminosity per capita across roughly equally-sized pixels in each
country. We first generate a global grid of 25 x 25 decimal degrees (that extends from −180
to 180 degrees longitude and from 75 degrees latitude to −65 degrees latitude). Second, we
intersect the resulting grid with the 2000 Digital Chart of the World that portrays contemporary
national borders. This results in 4 865 pixels across the globe falling within country boundaries.
The median (mean) box extends to 22 438 (27 622) km2, being comparable to the size of ethnic
homelands in the GREG dataset, when we exclude small groups. Note that boxes intersected by
the coastline and national boundaries are smaller. Third, for each box we compute luminosity
per capita in 1992, 2000, and 2012. Fourth, we aggregate the data at the country level estimating
a Gini coeﬃcient that captures the overall degree of spatial inequality. The cross-country mean
(median) number of pixels used for the estimation of the spatial Ginis is 249 (8); so these Ginis
are quite comparable to the ethnic inequality measures.
2.2.2 Inequality across Administrative Regions
We also compiled inequality measures across administrative units, using data from the GADM
Global Administrative Areas database on the boundaries of administrative regions. Following
a similar procedure to the derivation of the ethnic inequality and the overall spatial inequality
indexes, we construct measures reflecting inequality (in lights per capita) across first-level and
second-level administrative units. In our sample of 173 countries, the median (mean) number
of first-level administrative units is 13 (17). A median (mean) first-level administrative unit
8 ethnic (37 linguistic) areas host less than one percent of Kenya’s population as of 2000. So, we construct Gini
coeﬃcients (i) using all ethnic groups (19 and 53), (ii) dropping ethnic regions where the capital (Nairobi) falls
(18 and 52), and (iii) using the 11 ethnic and 16 linguistic groups, respectively, whose populations exceed 1% of
Kenya’s population.
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spans roughly 7 197 (44 050) square kilometers, which is somewhat larger than the median size
(4 578) for groups in the Atlas Narodov Mira. The cross-country median (mean) size of second-
level administrative units is 110 (301) 2. So, these units are much smaller than the Ethnologue
or the Atlas Narodov Mira homelands.
2.2.3 Inequality across Perturbed Ethnic Regions
We have also created ethnic Gini coeﬃcients using perturbed ethnic regions. Using as inputs
the centroids of ethnic-linguistic homelands, we generate Thiessen polygons that have the unique
property that each polygon contains only one input point and that any location within a polygon
is closer to its associated point than to a point within any other polygon. Thiessen polygons
have the exact same centroids as the actual linguistic and ethnic homelands in the Ethnologue
and GREG databases, respectively; the key diﬀerence being that the actual homelands have
idiosyncratic shapes.9 We then construct a spatial Gini coeﬃcient that reflects inequality in
lights per capita across these sets of Thiessen polygons. The mean size of the Thiessen polygons
based on the Ethnologue (GREG) database is 11 862 (58 784) km2, very similar to the mean size
of homelands in the Ethnologue (GREG) —12 676 (61 213) km2.
Comment All three proxies of the spatial inequality also reflect inequality across ethnic
homelands, since (i) there is clearly some degree of measurement error on the exact boundaries
of ethnic regions, (ii) population mixing is likely higher than the one we observe in the data.
Moreover, in several countries, administrative boundaries follow ethnic lines, while in the case
of large groups, the spatial Gini coeﬃcients may also (partially) capture within-ethnic-group
inequality.10
2.3 Example
Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustration of the construction of the ethnic inequality measures for
Afghanistan. The Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) maps 31 ethnicities (Figure 1) whereas the
Ethnologue reports 39 languages (Figure 2). According to GREG, the Afghan (Pashtuns) is the
largest group residing in the southern and central-southern regions. This group makes up 51% of
9Note that there are very few instances in which the number of Thiessen polygons is not identical to the number
of the underlying groups (for example, there is a diﬀerence of one group for 6 out of the 173 countries in the
Ethnologue). This diﬀerence is due to the fact that a handful of border/coastal groups have such a peculiar shape
that their centroid falls out of the country’s boundaries they belong to. Hence, since Thiessen polygons are based
on the centroids of the ethnic-linguistic groups that fall within the country, those groups whose centroids fall
outside are not taken into account. Note that this has virtually no eﬀect on the results since when we focus on the
countries where the number of Thiessen polygons is identical to the number of groups the pattern is the same.
10 In principle one could generate within-group inequality measures using the finer structure of the luminosity
data. However, within-group mobility and risk sharing issues make a luminosity-based, within-group inequality
index less satisfactory.
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the population in 2000. The second largest group are the Tajik people, who compose 22% of the
population and are located in the north-eastern regions and in scattered pockets in the western
part of the country. There are 8 territories in which groups overlap.
Figures 1 and 2 portray the distribution of lights per capita for each group with lighter
colors indicating more brightly-lit homelands. The center of the country, where the Hazara-Berberi
reside, is poor; the same applies to the eastern provinces, where the Nuristani, the Pamir Tajiks,
the Pashai, and the Kyrgyz groups are located. Luminosity is higher in the Pashtun/Pathans
homelands and to some lesser extent in the Tajik regions. Second, using lights per capita across
all homelands, we estimate the Gini coeﬃcient in 1992, in 2000, and in 2012. In 2000 the Gini
coeﬃcient estimated from GREG (Ethnologue) is 095 (090).11 We also estimated the ethnic
inequality measures excluding the ethnic homeland where the capital, Kabul, falls. In this case
the ethnic Ginis are similar (095 with GREG and 091 with Ethnologue). For robustness, we
also estimated Gini coeﬃcients of ethnic inequality excluding groups constituting less than 1%
of the country’s population. In this case the Gini coeﬃcient with the GREG mapping is based
on just 4 groups, while the Ethnologue-based Gini is based on 7 ethnic homelands.
Figure 3 illustrates the construction of the overall spatial inequality. When we divide
the globe into boxes of 25 x 25 decimal-degree boxes, we get 24 areas in Afghanistan. The
estimated Gini index capturing the overall degree of spatial inequality in Afghanistan is 073.
For consistency we also estimated the overall spatial inequality (Gini) index excluding the pixel
where the capital city falls or those boxes where less than 1% of the country’s population lived in
2000. Figures 4 and 4 illustrate the construction of inequality measures across administrative
regions using both the first-level and second-level units. There are 32 provinces (velayat) that
constitute the first-level administrative units and there are 328 second-level administrative units
(wuleswali). After estimating average luminosity per capita for each unit, we construct Gini
indexes capturing inequality in development across administrative regions. Again, we construct
these inequality measures using all regions, dropping the capital, and also excluding those units
with less than one percent of total population. In our example, the first-level administrative unit
Gini index is 076 and the second-level administrative unit Gini coeﬃcient is 093. Figures 5
and 5 illustrate the derivation of the perturbed ethnic homelands Gini index for Afghanistan
based on the Atlas Narodov Mira and the Ethnologue, respectively. There are 31 and 39 Thiessen
polygons, as many as the number of ethnic and linguistic groups. The centroids of the Thiessen
polygons are identical to the ones of the actual homelands, the only diﬀerence being that the
actual homelands have rather peculiar shapes.
11Since the Gridded Population of the World reports zero population for some ethnic areas, the Gini index with
the GREG mapping is based on 27 ethnic observations, while the Gini coeﬃcient with the Ethnologue mapping is
based on 39 linguistic groups (no gaps in this case).
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2.4 Descriptive Evidence
2.4.1 Ethnic Inequality around the World
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the baseline ethnic inequality measures and the proxies of
the overall degree of spatial inequality and regional inequality across administrative units. The
average and median values of the ethnic Gini coeﬃcients are quite similar with both mappings
in each year (around 042− 049 in 2000). The average (median) value of the overall spatial Gini
coeﬃcient in 2000 is similar, 042 (043). The Gini coeﬃcients based on administrative regions are
on average smaller when estimated across first-level units (mean 037) and larger when estimated
at the finer second-level (mean 057). Moreover, regional inequality seems to be slightly trending
downward, as all Gini coeﬃcients are smaller in 2012 (and in 2000). This may be driven by the
expansion of electrification (and regional convergence) in many underdeveloped and developing
countries (mostly in Africa and South Asia).
Figures 6 and 6 illustrate the global distribution of ethnic inequality with the GREG and
Ethnologue mapping, respectively. Sub-Saharan Africa and East and South Asia host the most
ethnically unequal countries. For example, with the Ethnologue mapping the mean (median) of
the baseline ethnic inequality index for Sub-Saharan African countries is 063 (0728), while for
South and East Asian countries the corresponding mean (and median) value of the ethnic Gini
index is 059 (069).12 In contrast, Western Europe is the region with the lowest level of ethnic
inequality (mean and median values of ethnic Gini around 024). According to the Atlas Narodov
Mira, the five most ethnically unequal countries are Sudan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Zambia, and
Central African Republic with an average Gini coeﬃcient in luminosity across ethnic homelands of
091. According to the Ethnologue’s more detailed mapping of language groups, the countries with
the highest cross-ethnic-group inequality (where Gini exceeds 095) are: Democratic Republic of
Congo, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Chad.
Figures 6 and 6 plot the world distribution of the overall degree of spatial inequality and
regional inequality across first-level administrative units, respectively. As it is evident, spatial
and regional inequality is much higher in Asia and Africa as compared to Western Europe and
Latin America. The countries with the highest overall spatial inequality according to the measure
based on the 25 x 25 decimal degree boxes are Russia, Mongolia, Sudan, Peru, and Egypt; in all
these countries the spatial Gini coeﬃcient exceeds 090. The countries with the highest regional
inequality across first-level administrative units are Libya, Chad, and Guinea (Gini around 090).
We should stress that in some countries first-level administrative units cover large territories (in
12Specifically, ethnic inequality is particularly high across South Asia (in total seven countries, namely
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). The mean and median Gini index
is 0635 based on the Ethnologue and 055 when we use the GREG. Ethnic inequality is also high in the 21
countries of the East Asia and Pacific region, but only when we use the Ethnologue where the mean is 058.
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terms of both population and land area). Hence, inequality measured across these units may
not adequately capture existing regional inequalities. To partly account for this, we have also
constructed Gini coeﬃcients using second-level administrative regions that in many countries are
numerous. However, an important caveat to keep in mind throughout the analysis is that in
several countries regional inequalities and, more importantly, ethnic disparities in income may
occur at much finer levels of aggregation (e.g., neighborhoods) than what our ancestral-ethnic-
homeland approach allows for.13
Appendix Table 1 reports the correlation structure of the ethnic Gini coeﬃcients between
the two global maps at diﬀerent points in time. A couple of interesting patterns emerge. First,
the correlation of the Gini coeﬃcients across the two alternative mappings is strong, but not
overwhelming. The correlation with the baseline measures that uses all ethnic areas is around
075, but when we drop small groups or/and capitals the correlation falls to 065. In line with
our discussion above, these correlations suggest that the two maps capture somewhat diﬀerent
aspects of ethnic-linguistic cleavages. Second, in the 20-year period where luminosity data are
available (1992− 2012), ethnic inequality appears very persistent, as the correlations of the Gini
coeﬃcients over time exceed 090. Given the high inertia, in our empirical analysis below we will
exploit cross-country variation. Third, not surprisingly, the correlation between ethnic inequality
and the Gini coeﬃcient capturing the overall degree of spatial inequality and regional inequality
across (first-level) administrative units is positive, but again far from perfect. In particular,
the correlation of the ethnic Gini with the overall spatial Gini (based on artificial boxes) ranges
between 055 and 070, while the correlation of the ethnic Gini coeﬃcients with the administrative
unit Ginis is lower, around 050.
Since we are primarily interested in documenting the explanatory power of ethnic inequality
beyond the overall spatial inequality in most specifications, we control for the latter. Figures 6
and 6 portray the global distribution of ethnic inequality partialling out the eﬀect of the overall
spatial inequality.
2.4.2 Basic Correlations
Ethnic Diversity Appendix Table 2 - Panel  reports the correlation structure between the
various ethnic inequality and spatial inequality measures and the widely-used ethnolinguistic frag-
mentation indexes. We observe a positive correlation between ethnic inequality and linguistic-
13A case exemplifying this situation is that of South Africa, a country with sizable income diﬀerences between
ethnic groups. Since segregation, after the fall of the apartheid, occurs at much finer level than the ancestral
homelands, our data cannot capture this phenomenon. South Africa looks also quite equal when inequality is
measured across first-level administrative unit (0.22). This is very similar to the ethnic Ginis which are 0.20
with GREG and 0.28 with Ethnologue. However, regional inequality in South Africa is significantly higher when
estimated across second-level administrative units (Gini index is 0.40, very similar to the global mean and median
values).
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ethnic fractionalization (035 − 045). Figures 7 and 7 provide a graphical illustration of the
association between the two proxies of ethnic inequality and the ethnic and linguistic fragmen-
tation measures of Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet,
Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012), respectively. The correlation between ethnic inequality and
the segregation measures compiled by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) is also positive (020−045).
Ethnic inequality tends to go in tandem with segregation. This is reasonable since economic dif-
ferences between groups are more likely to persist when groups are also geographically separated.
We also examine the association between ethnic inequality and spatial inequality with the ethnic
polarization indicators of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), failing to detect a systematic asso-
ciation. These patterns suggest that the ethnic inequality measure captures a dimension distinct
from already-proposed aspects of a country’s ethnic composition.
Income Inequality We then examined the association between ethnic inequality and in-
come inequality, as reflected in the standard Gini coeﬃcient (Appendix Table 2 - Panel ). The
income Gini coeﬃcient is taken from Easterly (2007), who using survey and census data compiled
by the WIDER (UN’s World Institute for Development Economics Research) constructs adjusted
cross-country Gini coeﬃcients for more than a hundred countries over the period 1965 − 2000.
Figures 8 and 8 illustrate this association using the GREG and the Ethnologue mapping, respec-
tively. The correlation between ethnic inequality and economic inequality is moderate, around
025−030. Yet this correlation weakens considerably and becomes statistically insignificant once
we simply condition on continental constants.
3 Ethnic Inequality and Development
3.1 Baseline Estimates
In Table 2 we report cross-country least squares estimates (OLS), relating the log of per capita
GDP in 2000 with ethnic inequality. In Panel A we use the ethnic inequality measure based on
the Atlas Narodov Mira mapping, while in Panel B we use the measures derived from Ethnologue’s
mapping. In all specifications we include region-specific constants (following the World Bank’s
classification) to account for continental diﬀerences in ethnic inequality and comparative economic
development.
The coeﬃcient of the ethnic inequality index in column (1) is negative and significant
at the 1% level. Figures 9 − 9 illustrate the unconditional and the conditional on regional
fixed eﬀects association. Specification (2) also reveals a negative association between economic
development and the overall degree of spatial inequality, as reflected on the Gini coeﬃcient based
on pixels of 25 x 25 degrees. This suggests that underdevelopment goes in tandem with regional
inequalities. In column (3) we include both the ethnic inequality Gini index and the spatial Gini
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coeﬃcient. The estimate on the ethnic inequality Gini is stable with both the GREG and the
Ethnologue mapping. In contrast, the coeﬃcient on the overall spatial inequality measure drops
considerably and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero in both models. This suggests
that the ethnic component of spatial inequality is the relatively stronger negative correlate of
development.
In column (4) we associate the log of per capita GDP with the log number of eth-
nic/linguistic groups. In line with previous works, income per capita is significantly lower in
countries with many ethnic (Panel A) and linguistic (Panel B) groups; yet the estimates in col-
umn (5), where we jointly include in the empirical model the proxies of ethnic inequality and
fractionalization, show that it is income diﬀerences along ethnic lines rather than ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity per se that correlates with underdevelopment. The results are similar when we
jointly include in the specification the ethnic Gini index, the overall spatial inequality measure,
and the fractionalization measure in column (6). Although due to the small number of obser-
vations and multi-collinearity (see Appendix Table 1), these results should be interpreted with
caution, only the ethnic inequality measure enters with a statistically significant estimate.
In columns (7)-(8) we examine whether the significantly negative association between eth-
nic inequality and income per capita is driven by an unequal clustering of population across
ethnic homelands or by the skewness in the size of ethnic homelands; to do so we construct Gini
coeﬃcients of population and land area that capture inequality in the size of ethnic homelands.
The ethnic inequality Gini index retains its economic and statistical significance, while both the
population and the homeland size ethnic Ginis enter with statistically indistinguishable from zero
estimates. This suggests that the association between ethnic inequality and underdevelopment is
not driven by inequality in the size of ethnic homelands captured either by the population of each
group or the area of each homeland. In column (9) we also control for a country’s size including
in the empirical model the log of population in 2000 and log of land area, as ethnic heterogene-
ity, ethnic inequality, and the overall degree of spatial inequality are likely to be increasing in
size. Doing so has little eﬀect on our results. Ethnic inequality remains a systematic correlate of
underdevelopment.
The estimate on the ethnic inequality index with the Atlas Narodov Mira mapping in
Panel A (column 9) implies that a reduction in the ethnic Gini coeﬃcient by 025 (one standard
deviation, from the level of Nigeria where the ethnic Gini is 076 to the level of Namibia where
the ethnic Gini is 053) is associated with a 28% (025 log points) increase in per capita GDP
(these countries have very similar overall spatial Ginis of around 08). The standardized beta
coeﬃcient of the ethnic inequality index is around 020− 030, quite similar to the works on the
role of institutions on development (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)).
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Other Aspects of the Ethnic Composition In Table 3 we investigate whether other
dimensions of the distribution of the population across groups, related to fractionalization, po-
larization, and genetic diversity, rather than income inequality across ethnic lines, influence com-
parative development. In columns (1) and (6) we augment the specification with the Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg
(2012) ethnic and linguistic fractionalization measures, respectively. Doing so has no eﬀect on the
coeﬃcient on ethnic inequality that retains its economic and statistical significance. Moreover,
the fractionalization indicators enter with unstable and statistically insignificant estimates, sug-
gesting that it is diﬀerences in well-being across ethnic lines that explain underdevelopment rather
than fragmentation per se.14 In columns (2) and (7) we experiment with Fearon’s (2003) cultural
fragmentation index that adjusts the fractionalization index for linguistic distances among eth-
nic groups. Cultural fractionalization enters with a statistically insignificant estimate, while the
ethnic inequality Gini index retains its economic and statistical significance.
Motivated by recent works highlighting the importance of polarization (Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012)), in columns (3) and (8) we condi-
tion on an index of ethnic polarization. Ethnic inequality correlates strongly with development,
while the polarization measures enter with insignificant estimates.15
Building on the recent work of Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) showing that countries with
a high degree of ethnolinguistic segregation tend to have low quality national institutions and
ineﬃcient bureaucracies, in columns (4) and (9) we include in the specifications their measures of
ethnic and linguistic segregation, respectively. The sample falls considerably, as these measures
are available for approximately 90 countries. While there is some evidence that ethnic segregation
is a feature of underdevelopment, the coeﬃcient on the ethnic inequality proxy continues to be
quite stable and significant at standard confidence levels.
In columns (5) and (10) we condition on a proxy of within-country genetic diversity, based
on migratory distance of each country’s capital from Ethiopia. Since Ashraf and Galor (2013)
argue that the eﬀect of genetic diversity on development is non-linear, we enter the latter in
a quadratic fashion (though this has no eﬀect on our results). In all permutations the ethnic
inequality proxy enters with a stable (around −1) and highly significant estimate.
Overall the results in Table 3 show that the strong negative association between ethnic
inequality and income across countries is not mediated by diﬀerences in the societies’ ethnic or
14When we do not include the ethnic inequality Ginis, the ethnic and linguistic fragmentation measures enter
with negative and significant (at the 10%− 5%) estimates (approx. −055).
15The same applies if we use alternative measures of ethnic-linguistic polarization. Overall polarization is signif-
icantly related to civil conflict but not to income per capita. We also estimated specifications including both the
polarization and the fractionalization indicators; in all perturbations the coeﬃcient on ethnic inequality retains its
statistical and economic significance.
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genetic composition.16
Alternative Measures of Ethnic Inequality and Geographic Controls In Table
4 we augment the main specification with an array of geographic traits and experiment with
alternative measures of ethnic inequality. In columns (1) and (4) we use the baseline ethnic
inequality measures based on all homelands. In columns (2) and (5) we use ethnic Ginis that
exclude from the estimation regions where capitals fall. Note that the sample drops as in these
models we do not consider mono-ethnic and mono-linguistic countries. In columns (3) and (6)
we introduce ethnic Ginis that exclude groups with less than 1% of a country’s population. Note
that a priori there is no reason to exclude small groups, since ethnic hatred may be directed
to minorities that, nevertheless, control a significant portion of the economy (Chua (2003)).
Moreover, by dropping these groups, the sample of ethnic homelands used to estimate the ethnic
Ginis drops considerably.17 To avoid concerns of self-selecting the conditioning set, we follow
the baseline specification of Nunn and Puga (2012) and include (on top of log population and
log land area) an index of terrain ruggedness, distance to the coast, an index of gem quality,
the percentage of each country with fertile soil and the percentage of tropical land (the Data
Appendix gives variable definitions). To isolate the role of ethnic inequality on development
from regional inequalities and ethnic fragmentation, in all specifications we control for the overall
degree of spatial inequality in lights per capita and ethnic-linguistic fractionalization.
The negative correlation between ethnic inequality and income per capita remains strong.
This applies to all proxies of ethnic inequality. While compared to the unconditional specifica-
tions, the estimate on ethnic Gini declines somewhat, it retains significance at standard confidence
levels. Thus, while still an unobserved or omitted country-wide factor may jointly aﬀect develop-
ment and ethnic inequality, the estimates clearly point out that the correlation does not reflect
(observable) mean diﬀerences in commonly-employed geographical characteristics.
3.2 Inequality across Administrative Units, Ethnic Inequality, and Develop-
ment
We now examine the relationship between ethnic inequality and comparative development, ac-
counting for regional disparities across administrative units. In this regard, as described in Section
2, we have constructed Gini coeﬃcients reflecting inequality in lights per capita across first- and
16We also experimented with the newly constructed index of birthplace diversity of Alesina, Harnoss, and
Rapoport (2013), again finding that the link between ethnic inequality and under-development is robust.
17On average the number of ethnic (linguistic) groups per country falls from 11 (39) to 42 (7). Likewise while
the median number of groups across the 173 countries is 8 (with both GREG and Ethnologue), when we drop
groups consisting less than 1% of a country’s population, the medians fall to 3 (GREG) and 4 (Ethnologue). In
contrast to the ethnic inequality measures, the spatial Gini and the administrative unit Ginis do not aﬀected much
when we drop small in terms of population pixels and administrative regions.
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second-level administrative units. This variable is quite useful in many ways. First, as admin-
istrative units are well-defined, the regional Ginis are easily interpretable. Second, examining
the link between spatial inequality across administrative regions and development is interesting
by itself. A vast literature that goes back at least to the work of Williamson (1965) has stud-
ied theoretically and empirically the inter-linkages between development and spatial (regional)
inequality. (See the reviews of Kanbur and Venables (2008) and Kim (2009) for recent works).
Third, since in some countries ethnic boundaries have formed the basis for the delineation of
administrative units, we can directly test whether the strong cross-country correlation between
inequality across ethnic homelands and GDP per capita reflects an inverse relationship between
inequality across politically defined regions and comparative development.
Table 5 reports the results. Let us start with Panel  where we use Gini coeﬃcients
of regional inequality estimated across first-level administrative units. On average there are 18
first-level administrative units in each country. Examples of first-unit regions include the German
lander (16), the US (50), Brazilian (27), and Indian (35) states, the Swiss cantons (26), and the
Chinese provinces and autonomous regions (32). The coeﬃcient on the administrative unit Gini
index in the unconditional specification (in [1]) is negative and highly significant (−160). This
suggests that underdevelopment is characterized by large regional diﬀerences in well-being (or
public goods provision). This is in accord with our earlier results (e.g., Table 2, column [2])
showing a similar pattern when using the overall spatial inequality Gini. In columns (2) and
(6) we include both the administrative unit and the ethnic inequality Ginis (using the Atlas
Narodov Mira and Ethnologue mapping, respectively). Both inequality measures enter with
negative and significant estimates (magnitude around −1). In columns (3) and (7) we control
for ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (using the Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat,
and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) measures, respectively).
In line with our previous estimates, once we account for inequalities across ethnic (and now also
across administrative) regions, there is no systematic link between ethnolinguistic fragmentation
and development. In columns (4), (5), (8), and (9) we control for country size (log population
and log land area) and the rich set of geographic features. The results remain intact. Across
all permutations both the ethnic inequality measure and the Gini index capturing inequality
across first-level administrative units enter with negative and highly significant coeﬃcients. The
"standardized" beta coeﬃcients that summarize in terms of standard deviations the change in
the outcome variable (log of per capita GDP) induced by a one-standard-deviation change in the
independent variables are comparable for the two inequality measures, around 020.
Table 5 - Panel  reports similar specifications where administrative-level inequality is
estimated across second-level units. The GADM database does not report second-level adminis-
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trative units for all countries, hence the sample drops to 135 (we mostly lose small countries, such
as Singapore, Jamaica, and Swaziland). The results are similar if we assign to these countries
the first-level administrative unit Gini coeﬃcients. As the median (mean) number of such units
is 110 (301), the respective Ginis are estimated using a very fine aggregation. Examples include
the German (regierungsbezirk) government regions (40), the French département (96), and the
Brazilian municipalities (5503). The coeﬃcient on the administrative region Gini index in column
(1) is negative and significant at the 90% level; yet its magnitude is considerably smaller than
the analogous one with the first-level administrative Gini index (−061). (The implied "beta"
coeﬃcient is −010). The coeﬃcient on the administrative region Gini drops considerably and
loses its statistical significance once we include the ethnic inequality proxy (columns [2] and [5])
and condition on ethnolinguistic fragmentation (columns [3] and [6]). In contrast, the ethnic
inequality measure retains its statistical and economic significance. The coeﬃcient on the ethnic
Gini is unaﬀected when we condition on size and geography (in [4], [5], [8], and [9]).
The evidence in Table 5 reveals two important findings. First, in a large cross-section of
countries there is a clear negative association between economic performance and regional in-
equalities across first-level administrative units. This new (to the best of our knowledge) finding
adds to the literature in urban economics and economic geography that studies the relation-
ship between regional economic disparities and the process of development.18 Second, and more
important given our focus, the strong cross-country link between ethnic inequality and under-
development does not capture the similarly negative association between GDP per capita and
economic diﬀerences across politically defined spatial units.
3.3 Perturbing Ethnic Homelands
We now explore whether the pattern uncovered so far survives a horse race between ethnic in-
equality constructed using the original mappings and ethnic inequality based on slightly modified
ethnic homelands.19 Showing that our original ethnic inequality measures dominate the Gini
index based on perturbed ethnic homelands would suggest that not only are the centroids of the
groups correctly identified in the original maps, but that also the specific boundaries delineated
are more precise than the Thiessen based ones. Eﬀectively, this sensitivity check investigates how
precisely drawn the groups’ boundaries are in the underlying datasets.
Table 6 reports the results of the "horse race" regressions, examining the link between
18Note that due to the lack of comparable regional income data across countries, empirical works on spatial
inequalities have mostly been country-specific and the few existing comparative studies have relied on small samples
(e.g., Lessmann (2014), Ezcurra (2013))
19As explained in Section 2 we are creating the modified groups’ homelands generating two alternative sets of
Thiessen polygons, one using as input points the centroids of the linguistic homelands according to the Ethnologue
dataset, and the other using the respective centroids of the Atlas Narodov Mira. Thiessen polygons have the exact
same centroids as the actual linguistic and ethnic homelands in the Ethnologue and GREG databases, respectively.
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the log of per capita GDP and ethnic inequality, conditional on the perturbed ethnic homelands
Gini index. Across all specifications the ethnic Gini index enters with a negative and significant
estimate that is quite similar (around −09) to the more parsimonious specifications in Tables
2−4. In contrast, the Gini index based on the perturbed ethnic areas (Thiessen polygons) enters
with an unstable and statistically indistinguishable from zero estimate. It is perhaps instructive
to point out that the perturbed linguistic homelands of Ethnologue seem to have little predictive
power on GDP per capita beyond the role of ethnic inequality based on the Ethnologue homelands
themselves, whereas for the case of GREG the perturbed ethnic inequality index enters with a
(consistent) negative sign and is of moderate magnitude. This pattern is in line with the idea
that the Ethnologue compared to GREG’s mapping may have less measurement error since the
former draws from a wealth of resources that are up-to-date and more precisely documented,
unlike GREG which derives from maps of the 1960s.
3.4 Further Robustness Checks
We have performed numerous sensitivity checks to investigate the robustness of the strong cross-
country association between ethnic inequality and under-development. We report and discuss in
detail these robustness checks in the on-line Supplementary Appendix. Specifically, we show that
the results are similar when: (i) we do not include region fixed eﬀects; (ii) we estimate ethnic
Ginis without taking into account observations neither from capitals nor from small groups; (iii)
we drop from the estimation (typically small) countries with just one ethnic or linguistic group;
(iv) we use radiance-calibrated luminosity data to construct all inequality measures (so as to
account for top-coding in the lights data that occurs at the major urban centers); (v) we account
for the resolution of population estimates at the grid level that are used to compile the inequality
measures; (vi) we use non-standardized by population inequality measures (based on lights) and
control for inequality in the distribution of population across ethnic areas; (vii) we perform the
analysis at various nodes of Ethnologue’s linguistic tree (this approach follows Desmet, Ortuño-
Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) who show that the impact of ethnic fractionalization on growth,
public goods, and conflict depends on the level of linguistic aggregation); (viii) we try accounting
for measurement error of the underlying mapping of groups estimating two-stage-least-squares
models that extract the common component of ethnic inequality from both Ethnologue and the
Atlas Narodov Mira; (ix) on top of the rich set of geographic variables, we also condition on various
historical controls; (x) we drop iteratively from the estimation a diﬀerent continent/region and
focus within each region separately. The regional analysis reveals that the development-ethnic
inequality nexus is non-existent for countries in Western Europe and North America and weak in
Latin America. On the contrary, the association is especially strong within East and South Asia
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as well as for countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
4 On the Origins of Ethnic Inequality
Given the strong correlation between ethnic inequality and underdevelopment, we have investi-
gated the roots of inequality across ethnic lines.
4.1 Historical (Colonial) Origins
We started by examining the association between ethnic inequality and commonly used historical
correlates of contemporary development. There is little evidence linking contemporary diﬀerences
in well-being across ethnic groups to the legal tradition (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998)), the conditions that European settlers faced at the time of colonization, as cap-
tured by settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)) or pre-colonial population
densities (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002)), the share of Europeans in the population
(Hall and Jones (1999) and Putterman and Weil (2010)), and border design and state artificial-
ity (Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)); for brevity, we report these results in the online
Supplementary Appendix.20 These insignificant associations suggest that the strong negative cor-
relation between ethnic inequality and development does not reflect the aforementioned aspects
of history.
4.2 Geographic Origins
Motivated by the insight of Michalopoulos (2012) that diﬀerences in land endowments gave rise to
location-specific human capital, leading to the formation of ethnolinguistic groups, we investigated
whether diﬀerences in geographic and ecological attributes play a role in explaining contemporary
income disparities across ethnic lines. To the extent that land endowments shape ethnic human
capital and aﬀect the diﬀusion and adoption of technology and innovation (e.g., Diamond (1997)),
then ethnic-specific inequality in the distribution of geographic features would manifest itself in
contemporary diﬀerences in well-being across groups.21
To construct proxies of geographic inequality, we obtained georeferenced data on elevation,
land suitability for agriculture, distance to the coast, precipitation, and temperature and calcu-
lated for each ethnic area the mean value.22 We then derived Gini coeﬃcients at the country
20There is also no association between ethnic inequality and proxies of the inclusiveness of early institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008)) and state history (Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002)).
21Language diﬀerences between groups are likely to exacerbate the limited mobility across ethnic homelands
induced by the underlying diﬀerences in ethnic-specific human capital.
22 In the previous draft of the paper, we also used information on the share of each ethnic area covered by water
bodies (lakes, rivers, and other streams). The results are similar; we omit this variable because luminosity gets
magnified over water areas due to bleeding-blooming.
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level that reflect group-specific inequality in each of these (five) dimensions. We also estimated
measures of the overall degree of inequality in geographic endowments, constructing for each of
the five geographic traits spatial Gini coeﬃcients across boxes of 2.5 x 2.5 decimal degrees and
across administrative units.
Preliminary Evidence In Table 7 we explore the association between ethnic inequality
(in lights per capita) and these measures of inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic
homelands. Specifications (1) and (5) simply condition on region fixed eﬀects. To isolate the
ethnic-specific component, in columns (2) and (6) we include in the empirical model Gini coeﬃ-
cients capturing the overall degree of spatial inequality across each of these five traits, while in
columns (3) and (7) we include Gini coeﬃcients of inequality in the same five geographic features
across first-level administrative units. In specifications (4) and (8) we include as controls the
country averages of each of the five variables. In almost all permutations, all five ethnic Ginis
enter with positive estimates; this suggests that ethnic-specific diﬀerences in geo-ecological en-
dowments translate into larger disparities in ethnic contemporary development. Depending on
the specification details —GREG or Ethnologue mapping, whether we condition on the level of
each geographical trait and regional inequality in each of the five geographic features— diﬀerent
Gini coeﬃcients of geographic inequality enter with significant estimates. For example, in the
specifications using the GREG mapping, the Ginis capturing inequality in elevation and proxim-
ity to the coast enter with significant estimates, while in the Ethnologue-based models the Gini
indicators reflecting inequality in land quality for agriculture and temperature are the key cor-
relates of ethnic inequality. Moreover, the controls capturing inequality across random pixels or
administrative regions all enter with statistically insignificant estimates (coeﬃcients not shown).
Thus, while we cannot precisely identify which geographic feature(s) matter most, the message
from Table 7 is that diﬀerences in geography across ethnic regions translate into diﬀerences in
contemporary ethnic inequality.
A Composite Index of Inequality in Geographic Endowments We thus aggregate
the five Gini indexes of ethnic inequality in geographic endowments via principal components.
The use of factor-analysis techniques is appropriate in our context because we have many variables
(Gini coeﬃcients) that aim at capturing a similar concept (with some degree of noise), namely
inequality in ethnic-specific geographic attributes. Moreover, we are not sure about which aspects
of geographic inequality should matter the most. Table 8 reports the results of the principal
component analysis. The first principal component explains approximately 60% of the common
variance of the five measures of inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands
and close to 50% when we estimate Gini coeﬃcients across pixels of (roughly) the same size and
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across first-level administrative units. The second principal component explains around 20% of
the total variance, while jointly the other principal components explain a bit less than a fourth of
the total variance. All five inequality measures load positively on the first principal component.
This applies to all inequality measures (across ethnic and linguistic homelands, administrative
regions, and boxes). The eigenvalue of the first principal component is greater than two in
all permutations (one being the rule of thumb), while the eigenvalues of the other principal
components are close to and less than one. We thus focus on the first principal component,
which given the significant positive loadings of all Gini coeﬃcients, we label as "inequality in
geographic endowments across ethnic homelands."
Inequality in Geography across Ethnic Homelands and Ethnic Inequality In
Figures 10 and 10 we plot the baseline index of ethnic inequality (based on lights per capita)
against the first principal component of inequality in ethnic-specific geographic endowments.
There is a strong positive correlation for both mappings (around 055), suggesting that diﬀerences
in geography explain a sizable portion of contemporary diﬀerences in development across ethnic
homelands.
In Table 9 we formally assess the role of ethnic-specific geographic inequality, as captured by
the composite index of inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic-linguistic homelands,
on contemporary ethnic inequality.23 Columns (1) and (5) show that the strong correlation il-
lustrated in the figures is not driven by continent-wide diﬀerences. In columns (2) and (6) we
control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments augmenting the
specifications with the first-principal component of the Gini coeﬃcients in geography using pixels
of 25 x 25 decimal degrees. Likewise, in specifications (3) and (7) we add the first principal com-
ponent of the geographic inequality measures across first-unit administrative regions. This has
little eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of the ethnic inequality in geographic endowments that retains its
economic and statistical significance (at the 99% level). Moreover, the two proxies of the overall
degree of spatial inequality in geography enter with small coeﬃcients that also have the "wrong
sign" and are not always statistically significant. In columns (4) and (8) we control for the level
eﬀects of geography, augmenting the specification with the country average values of elevation,
23 In this (as well as in the subsequent) tables, we also report bootstrap standard errors that account for the fact
that the key independent variable —inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands— is a "generated"
regressor (as it is a principal component capturing a geography factor, see Wooldridge (2002)). Our bootstrap
method works as follows. A random sample with replacement is generated from the full sample of countries. In
this random sample, we extract the first principal component of the five Gini indicators that capture inequality in
geography across ethnic lines on elevation, precipitation, temperature, distance to coast, and land quality. We then
use this principal component (from the random sample) in the regression (where the dependent variable is ethnic
inequality). This process is repeated 10 000 times. Table 9 gives the standard deviation of the coeﬃcient estimates
across all (10 000) replications (see for a similar approach the recent study of Ashraf and Galor (2013)). As can be
seen, bootstrap standard errors are very similar to standard heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors.
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precipitation, temperature, distance to the coast, and land suitability for agriculture. The com-
posite index reflecting diﬀerences in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands continues
entering with a positive and significant coeﬃcient. The estimate with the Ethnologue mapping
(012) implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the inequality in geography across ethnic
homelands index (174 points, from Zambia to Ethiopia) translates into a 20-percentage-point
increase in the ethnic inequality index (exactly as the diﬀerence in ethnic inequality between
Zambia and Ethiopia; somewhat more than half a standard deviation; see Table 1).
In the online Supplementary Appendix, we show that the link between ethnic inequality
and inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands prevails: (i) when we compile
cross-country composite indicators of inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic lines
using a richer set of geographic variables; (ii) when we condition on contemporary diﬀerences in
development across space or administrative unions; and (iii) when we iteratively drop diﬀerent
regions from the estimation.
5 Geographic Inequality and Development
5.1 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Eco-
nomic Development
Given the strong positive association between ethnic inequality and inequality in geographic
endowments, it is interesting to examine whether contemporary development is systematically
linked to the unequal distribution of geographic endowments across ethnic homelands. We thus
estimated LS specifications associating the log of real GDP p.c. in 2000 with the composite
index of ethnic-specific inequality in geography (across the five geographic dimensions). While
omitted-variables concerns cannot be eliminated, examining the role of inequality in geographic
endowments across ethnic homelands on comparative development assuages concerns that the
estimates in Tables 2 − 4 are driven by reverse causation. Moreover, geographic inequality can
be thought of as an alternative "primitive" measure of economic diﬀerences across linguistic
homelands (compared to the ethnic inequality index based on luminosity).
Table 10 reports the results. The coeﬃcient on the proxy of ethnic inequality in geographic
endowments in (1) and (5) is negative (around −013) and significant at the 99% confidence level.
This suggests that countries with sizable inequalities in geographic endowments across ethnic
homelands are —on average— less developed. In columns (2) and (6) we condition on the overall
degree of inequality in geography with the spatial Gini index based on boxes, while in columns (3)
and (7) we control for inequality in the geography across first-level administrative units. This al-
lows examining whether the negative association between development and geographic disparities
across ethnic homelands —revealed in (1) and (5)— capture the role of overall spatial geographic
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inequalities, unrelated to ethnicity. The composite measures capturing geographic inequalities
across space and across administrative regions enter with statistically indistinguishable from zero
estimates (that have also the "opposite sign"). In contrast, the composite index capturing in-
equality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands retains its statistical and economic
significance. These results further show that it is inequality across ethnic lines (in geography in
this case) rather than across space or administrative regions that correlates with underdevelop-
ment. The same applies when we control for the mean values of the five geographic variables
(in [4] and [8]). The most conservative estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase
in geographic inequality across ethnic homelands (17 points) decreases income per capita by
approximately 25% (022 log points).
In the online Supplementary Appendix, we show that the negative association between the
log income per capita and inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic lines is present also
when (i) we drop iteratively a diﬀerent region; (ii) we control for contemporary diﬀerences in
spatial development or inequality in lights per capita across administrative regions.
5.2 Geographic Inequality across Ethnic Homelands, Ethnic Inequality, and
Economic Development
Given the strong negative correlation between development and ethnic inequality both when the
latter is proxied by diﬀerences in geographic endowments (Table 10) or in disparities in luminos-
ity per capita (Tables 2 − 6), in Table 11 we report specifications linking development to both
measures. The results reveal that once we condition on contemporary ethnic income inequality
diﬀerences in geography across groups lose their power in explaining cross-country variation in de-
velopment. While some peculiar type of measurement error may explain this finding, it indicates
that ethnic-specific inequality in geographic endowments relates to contemporary development
primarily via its influence on ethnic inequality.
Since geographic inequality across ethnic lines does not seem to exert an independent
influence on GDP once we account for ethnic diﬀerences in well-being, we also estimated two-
stage-least-squares estimates associating geographic inequality across ethnic homelands to ethnic
inequality in lights per capita in the first stage and the component of ethnic inequality explained
by geographic disparities with the log per capita GDP in 2000 in the second stage. While the
2SLS estimates do not identify causal eﬀects, they account for measurement error in the proxy
measure of development (lights per capita) and also isolate the geography-driven component
of ethnic inequality. The 2SLS results (reported in the online Supplementary Appendix Table
23) reveal that the part of ethnic inequality that reflects geographic diﬀerences across ethnic
homelands is a significant correlate of development.
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Remark These results should not be interpreted as showing that unequal geography
across ethnic lines necessarily "causes" ethnic inequality (and under-development). It is possible
that certain groups for a plethora of reasons (e.g., higher early development, superior military
technology) conquered better-quality territories. In this regard the correlation between inequality
in geographic endowments across ethnic lines and ethnic inequality (captured by lights per capita)
indicates the sizable persistence of inequality. Hence, one might view an unequal ethnic geography
as a manifestation of deeper ethnic diﬀerences. Nevertheless, even in this case, it is the presence
of an inherently unequal geography that partially allows these primordial ethnic diﬀerences to
become salient (otherwise there would be no "better land" for stronger groups to conquer and
every group would have the same land endowment).
6 Conclusion
This study shows that ethnic diﬀerences in economic performance rather than the degree of ethnic
diversity or the overall level of inequality are negatively correlated with economic development.
While a large literature has examined (a) the interplay between inequality and development and
(b) the eﬀects of various aspects of the ethnic composition (such as fragmentation, polarization,
segregation) on economic performance, there is little work studying the linkages between ethnicity,
inequality, and cross-country comparative development. This paper is a first eﬀort to fill this gap.
First, combining linguistic maps on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups within coun-
tries with satellite images of light density at night, we construct Gini coeﬃcients reflecting in-
equality in well-being across ethnic lines for a large number of countries. Ethnic inequality
is weakly correlated with the standard measures of income inequality and modestly correlated
with ethnolinguistic fractionalization, polarization, and segregation. Second, we show that the
newly constructed proxy of ethnic inequality is negatively related to per capita GDP. The asso-
ciation retains its economic and statistical significance when we condition on inequality across
administrative units, which is also inversely related to development. Including in the empirical
specification both the ethnic inequality index and the widely-used ethnolinguistic fragmentation
indicators, the latter loses significance, suggesting that it is inequality across ethnic lines that
is correlated with poor economic performance rather than fractionalization per se. Third, we
conduct a preliminary exploration of the roots of contemporary diﬀerences in well-being across
ethnic groups. In this regard, we construct indicators of ethnic inequality in various geographic
endowments and show that contemporary diﬀerences in development across ethnic homelands
have a significant geographic component. Fourth, we show that geographic inequality across eth-
nic lines is also inversely related to contemporary development and that this correlation seems
to operate via ethnic inequality.
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Our study calls for future work both on the empirical and the theoretical front. One could
employ our cross-country data and approach to examine the role of specific policies, such as trade
openness and democratization, in shaping inequality across ethnic lines (and even administrative
regions) over time. Furthermore, building on the literature on institutions (e.g., Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005)) and state formation (e.g., Besley and Persson (2011)), one could
explore the role of initial —at independence— diﬀerences in standards of living across ethnic groups
on the subsequent path of economic and political modernization. Future works should also
employ within-country approaches that are more suitable for identifying the mechanisms at play.
For instance, it is of great interest to understand the channels via which ethnic diﬀerences in
income shape development. Does the link operate via the provision of public goods, via spurring
conflict and animosity, or by shaping trust and beliefs? For example, in ongoing work (Alesina,
Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2014)) we use a plethora of micro-level data from Africa to
assess the role of between-group and within-ethnic group inequality on public-goods provision,
trust, and civic and political participation within (rather than across) countries. Moreover, given
the large literature on inequality, fragmentation, and conflict, future work should explore in detail
the role of ethnic-level income diﬀerences on conflict (as Mitra and Ray (2014) do so in the case of
Hindu-Muslim conflict in India). Another avenue of future research is to compile between-group
inequality measures over time using detailed data from censuses, surveys, or tax records that are
available for some developed countries, in the spirit of Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011).
25
7 Maps & Figures
Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustration of the construction of the ethnic inequality measures for
Afghanistan. The Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) maps 31 ethnicities (Figure 1a) whereas the
Ethnologue reports 39 languages (Figure 1b).
Ü
Ethnic Homelands in Afghanistan
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Hazara-Berberi
Hazara-Deh-i-Zainat
Ishkashimis
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Russians
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Tajiks
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Overlapping Languages
Ethnologue Languages in Afghanistan
Aimaq
Ashkun
Brahui
Darwazi
Eastern Farsi
Gawar-Bati
Grangali
Gujari
Hazaragi
Kamviri
Kati
Kirghiz
Malakhel
Mogholi
Munji
Northeast Pashayi
Northwest Pashayi
Ormuri
Pahlavani
Parya
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Sanglechi-Ishkashimi
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Shughni
Shumashti
Southeast Pashayi
Southern Pashto
Southern Uzbek
Southwest Pashayi
Tajiki Spoken Arabic
Tangshewi
Tirahi
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Turkmen
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Wakhi
Warduji
Western Balochi
Wotapuri-Katarqalai
Ü
Figure 1a Figure 1b
Figures 2a and 2b portray the distribution of lights per capita for each group based on
GREG and Ethnologue mapping with lighter colors indicating more brightly lit areas.
Figure 2a Figure 2b
Figure 3 illustrates the construction of the overall spatial inequality. When we divide the
globe into boxes of 25 x 25 decimal-degree boxes, we get 24 areas in Afghanistan.
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Ü   Afghanistan
 Lights per Capita in 2000
Across Virtual Homelands
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Figure 3
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the construction of inequality measures across administrative
regions using both the first-level and second-level units.
Figure 4a Figure 4b
Figures 5a and 5b illustrate the perturbed ethnic homelands for Afghanistan based on the
Atlas Narodov Mira and the Ethnologue, respectively.
Figure 5a Figure 5b
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Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the global distribution of ethnic inequality with the GREG
and the Ethnologue mapping.
Figure 6a Figure 6b
Figures 6c and 6d plot the world distribution of the overall degree of spatial inequality and
regional inequality across first-level administrative units.
Figure 6c Figure 6d
Figures 6e and 6f portray the global distribution of ethnic inequality partialling out the
eﬀect of the overall spatial inequality.
Figure 6e Figure 6f
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Figures 7a and 7b provide a graphical illustration of the association between the two
proxies of ethnic inequality and the ethnic and linguistic fragmentation measures of Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg
(2012), respectively.
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Figure 7a Figure 7b
Figures 8a and 8b illustrate this association between income inequality and ethnic inequal-
ity using the Ethnologue and GREG mapping of group’s homelands.
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Figure 8a Figure 8b
Figures 9a−9d illustrate the unconditional and the conditional on regional fixed eﬀects
association between ethnic inequality and GDP per capita across countries.
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Figure 9a Figure 9b
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Figure 9c Figure 9d
In Figures 10a and 10b we plot the baseline index of ethnic inequality (based on lights per
capita) against the first principal component of inequality in ethnic-specific geographic endow-
ments. Figures 10c and 10d plot the conditional on regional fixed eﬀects association.
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8 Data Appendix
8.1 Country-Level Data
Income level: Log of real per capita GDP at PPP (Chain Index) in 2000. Source: Penn World
Tables, Edition 7. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).
Population: Log population in 2000. Source: Penn World Tables, Edition 7. Source:
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).
Land Area: Log surface area. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Income Inequality. Adjusted Gini coeﬃcient index averaged over the period 1965−1998.
Source: Easterly (2007); based on the United Nations World Institute for Development Economics
Research Data.
Ethnic/Linguistic Fractionalization: Index of ethnic/linguistic heterogeneity. It re-
flects the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to diﬀerent ethnolinguis-
tic/religious groups. For completeness we use two measures, one from Alesina et al. (2003),
which in turn is based on CIA Factbook and Encyclopedia Britannica and one from Desmet et
al. (2012), which is based on Ethnologue (level 15). Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012).
Ethnic/Linguistic Segregation: Index ranging from zero to one capturing ethnic/linguistic
segregation (clustering) within countries. If each region is comprised of a separate group, then
the index is equal to 1, and this is the case of complete segregation. If every region has the
same fraction of each group as the country as a whole, the index is equal to 0; this is the case
of no segregation. The index is increasing in the square deviation of regional-level fractions of
groups relative to the national average. The index gives higher weight to the deviation of group
composition from the national average in bigger regions than in smaller regions. Source: Alesina
and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Ethnolinguistic Polarization: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization that achieves its
maximum score when a country consists of two groups of equal size. Source: Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005).
Cultural Fragmentation: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization that accounts for
the degree of similarity between linguistic groups using the Ethnologue linguistic tree. Source:
Fearon (2003).
Genetic Diversity. The expected heterozygosity (genetic diversity) of a country’s con-
temporary population. The index is based on distances from East Africa to the year 1500 lo-
cations of the ancestral populations of the country’s component ethnic groups in 2000 and on
the pairwise migratory distances among these ancestral populations. The source countries of
the ancestral populations are identified from the World Migration Matrix (Putterman and Weil,
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2010), and the modern capital cities of these countries are used to compute the aforementioned
migratory distances. The measure of genetic diversity is then computed by applying (i) the coef-
ficients obtained from regressing expected heterozygosity on migratory distance from East Africa
at the ethnic group level, using a worldwide sample of 53 ethnic groups comprising the Human
Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel, compiled by the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP)
and the Centre d’Étude du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH); (ii) the coeﬃcients obtained from
regressing pairwise genetic distance on pairwise migratory distance in a sample of 1 378 HGDP-
CEPH ethnic group pairs, and (iii) the ancestry weights representing the fractions of the year
2000 national population that can trace their ancestral origins to diﬀerent source countries in the
year 1500. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Soil Quality: Percentage of each country with fertile soil. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Ruggedness: The terrain ruggedness index quantifies topographic heterogeneity. The
index is the average across all grid cells in the country not covered by water. The units for the
terrain ruggedness index correspond to the units used to measure elevation diﬀerences. Rugged-
ness is measured in hundreds of metres of elevation diﬀerence for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926
metres on the equator or any meridian) apart. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Tropical: The percentage of the land surface of each country with tropical climate. Source:
Nunn and Puga (2012).
Gem-Quality Diamond Extraction: Carats of gem-quality diamond extraction be-
tween 1958 and 2000, normalized by land area. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Common Law: Indicator variable that identifies countries that have a common law legal
system. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and Nunn and Puga
(2012).
European Descent: The variable, calculated from version 11 of the migration matrix
of Putterman and Weil (2010), estimates the percentage of the year 2000 population in every
country that is descended from people who resided in Europe in 1500. Source: Nunn and Puga
(2012).
Settler Mortality: Log of mortality rates faced by European colonizers in late 19th
century. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Population Density before Colonization: Log of population density around 1500 CE.
Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and Nunn and Puga (2012).
Border Straightness Index: The 0 − 1 index reflects how straight —and thus likely to
be non-organic— national borders are. Source: Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011).
Neolithic Transition: The logarithm of the number of thousand years elapsed (as of
the year 2000) since the majority of the population residing within a countries modern national
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borders began practicing sedentary agriculture as the primary mode of subsistence. This measure,
reported by Putterman (2008), is compiled using a wide variety of both region- and country-
specific archaeological studies as well as more general encyclopedic works on the transition from
hunting and gathering to agriculture during the Neolithic Revolution Source: Ashraf and Galor
(2013) and Putterman and Weil (2010).
Ethnic Partitioning: Percentage of the population of a country that belongs to parti-
tioned ethnic groups. Source: Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011).
Regional Fixed Eﬀects: The region constants correspond to: South-East Asia and the
Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The classification
follows World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.
8.2 Group-Level Data
Light Density at Night per Capita: Light density is calculated by averaging luminosity ob-
servations across pixels that fall within each territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands, boxes of 25
x 25 decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons) and then dividing by popu-
lation density. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical
Data Center.
http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html.
Population Density: Average number of people per square kilometer for 1990 and 2000.
Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia Uni-
versity, and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), 2005. Gridded Population of
the World Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Density Grids. Palisades, NY: Socioeconomic Data
and Applications Center (SEDAC), Columbia University.
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw.
Area: Total area (in square kilometers) of each territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands,
boxes of 25 x 25 decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons).
Elevation: Average elevation above country minimum value in meters. Source: World-
Clim - Global Climate Data. Data were originally collected by NASA-JPL SRTM.
http://www.worldclim.org/current.
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average land quality for cultivation within each
country. The index is the product of two components capturing the climatic and soil suitability
for farming. Source: Michalopoulos (2012); Original Source: Atlas of the Biosphere.
http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/grid_data_sel.php.
Distance to the Sea Coast: The geodesic distance from the centroid of each country
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to the nearest coastline, measured in 1000s of kilometers. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Mapping System. Series issue:
Version 3.0
Average Annual Precipitation: Average annual precipitation (mm) for the approxi-
mate 1950− 2000 time frame within the respective territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands, boxes
of 25 x 25 decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons). Source: WorldClim -
Global Climate Data. http://www.worldclim.org/bioclim.
Average Annual Temperature: Average annual temperature for the approximate 1950−
2000 time frame within the respective territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands, boxes of 25 x 25
decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons).
Source: WorldClim - Global Climate Data. http://www.worldclim.org/bioclim.
Precipitation Seasonality: Coeﬃcient of variation of annual precipitation for the ap-
proximate 1950 − 2000 time frame within the respective territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands,
boxes of 25 x 25 decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons). Source: World-
Clim - Global Climate Data. http://www.worldclim.org/bioclim.
Temperature Range: Range (estimated as the diﬀerence of the maximum value of the
warmest month minus the minimum value of the coldest month) of annual temperature for ap-
proximately the period 1950− 2000 within the respective territory (ethnic/linguistic homelands,
boxes of 25 x 25 decimal degrees, administrative units, and Thiessen polygons). Source: World-
Clim - Global Climate Data. http://www.worldclim.org/bioclim.
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Obs. mean st. dev. min p25 median p75 max
Number of Ethnic Homelands (GREG) 173 10.994 13.579 1 3 8 12 94
Ethnic Gini in 2012  (GREG) 173 0.406 0.248 0.00 0.21 0.44 0.57 0.96
Ethnic Gini in 2000 (GREG) 173 0.424 0.260 0.00 0.20 0.48 0.63 0.97
Ethnic Gini in 1992 (GREG) 173 0.473 0.280 0.00 0.27 0.54 0.70 0.96
Number of Linguistic Homelands (ETHNOLOGUE) 173 38.619 94.029 1 3 8 35 753
Ethno-Linguistic Gini in 2012 (ETHNOLOGUE) 173 0.439 0.325 0.00 0.13 0.44 0.74 0.98
Ethno-Linguistic Gini in 2000 (ETHNOLOGUE) 173 0.446 0.333 0.00 0.12 0.49 0.77 0.98
Ethno-Linguistic Gini in 1992 (ETHNOLOGUE) 173 0.487 0.346 0.00 0.14 0.54 0.80 0.99
Number of Pixels 173 19.572 36.838 1.00 4.00 8.00 20 292
Spatial Gini in 2012, Pixels 173 0.411 0.270 0.00 0.18 0.42 0.60 0.98
Spatial Gini in 2000, Pixels 173 0.421 0.269 0.00 0.18 0.43 0.64 0.97
Spatial Gini in 1992, Pixels 173 0.463 0.271 0.00 0.21 0.49 0.70 0.96
Number of 1st-Level Administrative Units 173 16.873 14.962 1.00 8.00 12.00 20 88
Administrative Unit (1st-level) Gini in 2012 173 0.353 0.202 0.00 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.93
Administrative Unit (1st-level) Gini in 2000 173 0.368 0.215 0.00 0.21 0.31 0.48 0.94
Administrative Unit (1st-level) Gini in 1992 173 0.422 0.241 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.59 0.94
Number of 2nd-Level Administrative Units 135 290.104 626.285 11.00 48.00 99.00 248 5478
Administrative Unit (2nd-level) Gini in 2012 135 0.562 0.237 0.14 0.35 0.56 0.78 0.95
Administrative Unit (2nd-level) Gini in 2000 135 0.572 0.250 0.15 0.36 0.55 0.83 0.96
Administrative Unit (2nd-level) Gini in 1992 135 0.639 0.249 0.13 0.43 0.68 0.87 0.98
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Cross-Country Inequality Measures
The table reports summary statistics for the main ethnic inequality, overall spatial inequality and administrative unit inequality measures 
employed in the cross-country analysis. Section 2  and the Data Appendix gives details on the construction of the ethnic inequality 
measures (Gini Coefficients). All Gini coefficients are estimated using luminosity per capita across ethnic homelands (in Panel A), across 
linguistic homelands (in Panel B), pixels/boxes of roughly same size (in Panel C), first-level administrative units (in Panel D), and second-
level administrative units (in Panel E).
Panel A: Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
Panel B: Ethnologue
Panel C: Pixels
Panel D: First-level Administrative Units
Panel E: Second-level Administrative Units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ethnic Inequality -1.3911*** -1.3900*** -0.9518** -0.9276* -1.3449*** -1.1032** -1.1172** 
  [Gini Coeff., GREG]  (0.2588)  (0.3416)  (0.3953)  (0.4845)  (0.4943)  (0.5188)  (0.5492)
Spatial Inequality -0.9973*** -0.0015 -0.0315 -0.0046 0.0104 -0.5592
  [Gini Coeff.,]  (0.2774)  (0.3510)  (0.3568)  (0.3539)  (0.3591)  (0.4749)
Log Number of Ethnicities -0.3136*** -0.1429 -0.1433 -0.2174* -0.1863
 [GREG]  (0.0612)  (0.0908)  (0.0917)  (0.1277)  (0.1440)
Ethnic Inequality in Population 0.6517 1.1554 1.0858
  [Gini Coeff., GREG]  (1.1500)  (1.1554)  (1.2546)
Ethnic Inequality in Size (Area) -0.7933 -0.7949 -0.8276
  [Gini Coeff., GREG]  (1.1732)  (1.1060)  (1.2297)
Log Land Area 0.1442
 (0.0879)
Log Population (in 2000) -0.1368
 (0.0829)
Adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.623 0.652 0.646 0.657 0.655 0.65 0.656 0.662
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2A - Baseline Estimates: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000), Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ethnic Inequality -1.1603*** -1.0745*** -1.1688*** -1.0636** -1.3452*** -1.2368*** -1.7186***
  [Gini Coeff., ETHNO]  (0.2328)  (0.2652)  (0.3587)  (0.4241)  (0.3469)  (0.4377)  (0.4549)
Spatial Inequality -0.9973*** -0.1549 -0.1564 -0.1760 -0.1992 -0.5351
  [Gini Coeff., Pixels]  (0.2774)  (0.3021)  (0.3136)  (0.3010)  (0.3165)  (0.4235)
Log Number of Languages -0.1921*** 0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0378 0.0726
 [ETHNO]  (0.0466)  (0.0688)  (0.0711)  (0.0826)  (0.0967)
Ethnic Inequality in Population 0.8012 0.8460 0.8453
  [Gini Coeff., ETHNO]  (0.9324)  (0.9387)  (0.9144)
Ethnic Inequality in Size (Area) -0.4898 -0.4574 -0.2958
  [Gini Coeff., ETHNO]  (0.8948)  (0.9045)  (0.8853)
Log Land Area 0.1366*  
 (0.0808)
Log Population -0.2105** 
 (0.0840)
Adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.623 0.652 0.632 0.652 0.65 0.651 0.649 0.665
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2B - Baseline Estimates: Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000), Ethnologue
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini coefficients reflect inequality in lights per capita 
across ethnic-linguistic homelands. In Table 2A we use the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) to aggregate lights per capita across ethnic homelands. In Table 
2B we use the digitized version of the Ethnologue database to aggregate lights per capita across linguistic homelands. The overall spatial inequality index (Gini coefficient) 
captures the degree of spatial inequality across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes intersected by national boundaries are of smaller size). Section 2 
gives details on the construction of the ethnic inequality and spatial inequality (Gini) indexes. The log number of ethnicities in columns (4)-(6), (8), and (9) denotes the logarithm 
of the number of ethnic and linguistic groups in each country according to the Atlas Narodov Mira (in Table 2A) and the Ehnologue (in Table 2B). Columns (7), (8), and (9) 
include as controls a Gini index capturing inequality in population across ethnic (linguistic) homelands and a Gini index capturing inequality in land area across ethnic (linguistic) 
homelands. Column (9 includes the log of country’s land area and the log of population in 2000.  All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust (heteroskedasticity—adjusted) standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ethnic Inequality -1.3911*** -1.6116*** -1.3987*** -1.4369*** -1.3684*** -1.0716*** -0.9620*** -1.0893*** -1.0477* -1.0108***
   [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3511)  (0.3876)  (0.3478)  (0.5274)  (0.3551)  (0.2932)  (0.2942)  (0.2619)  (0.5808)  (0.2901)
Ethnic/Linguistic Fragmentation 0.0055 -0.0061                
 (0.3549)  (0.2943)                
Cultural Fragmentation -0.3721 0.0108                
 (0.3486)  (0.3637)                
Ethno-linguistic Polarization 0.4442 0.6216                
 (1.0061)  (1.0004)                
Ethnic/Linguistic Segregation -1.3294* -0.1890                
(0.7294) (0.8974)               
Genetic Diversity 183.0360** 195.3181** 
 (84.5187)  (81.1672)
Genetic Diversity Square -130.1618** -140.5393** 
 (60.2510)  (58.3610)
Spatial Inequality -0.0021 0.2096 -0.0335 0.2086 0.0615 -0.1557 -0.1692 -0.1878 0.1651 -0.1015
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3541)  (0.3717)  (0.3540)  (0.4144)  (0.3407)  (0.3046)  (0.3086)  (0.3072)  (0.4348)  (0.3038)
Adjusted R-square 0.650 0.684 0.646 0.731 0.678 0.650 0.669 0.646 0.674 0.675
Observations 173 150 172 96 157 173 150 172 92 157
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3 - Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development
Ethnic Inequality and Other Features of Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation, Polarization, and Diversity
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini coefficients reflect inequality in lights per capita 
across ethnic homelands, based on the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (1)-(5) and based on the Ethnologue in columns (6)-(10). The overall spatial 
inequality index (Gini coefficient) captures the degree of spatial inequality across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes intersected by national boundaries 
and the coastline are of smaller size). Section 2 gives details on the construction of the ethnic inequality and spatial inequality (Gini) indexes. In columns (1) and (6) we control for 
ethnic and linguistic fragmentation using indicators that reflect the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will not be members of the same group (the ethnic 
fragmentation index in (1) comes from Alesina et al. (2003) and the linguistic fragmentation index in (6) comes from Desmet et al. (2013)). In columns (2) and (7) we control for 
cultural (linguistic) fragmentation using an index (from Fearon, 2003) that accounts for linguistic distances among groups. In columns (3) and (8) we control for ethnic polarization, 
using the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) index. In columns (4) and (9) we control for ethnic and linguistic segregation, respectively, using the measures of Alesina and 
Zhuravskaya (2011). In columns (5) and (10) we control for the genetic diversity index of Ashraf and Galor (2013). All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not 
reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All  Ethnic 
Areas
Excl. 
Capitals 
Excl. Small 
Groups
All Ethnic 
Areas
Excl. 
Capitals 
Excl. Small 
Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethnic Inequality -0.9172*** -0.6367* -0.9835** -0.7692*** -0.6262** -0.9356** 
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3287)  (0.3266)  (0.4503)  (0.2902)  (0.2909)  (0.3955)
Spatial Inequality -0.5698 -1.2035*** -1.1254*  -0.6952* -1.3366*** -1.0495*  
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3686)  (0.3700)  (0.6237)  (0.3825)  (0.3535)  (0.6105)
0.1409 0.3185 0.3793 0.1075 -0.0597 0.1411
 (0.3145)  (0.3009)  (0.3444)  (0.2671)  (0.2696) (0.2525)
Adjusted R-squared 0.724 0.760 0.736 0.723 0.759 0.734
Observations 173 155 173 173 147 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Conrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic/Linguistic 
Fragmentation
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini 
coefficients reflect inequality in lights per capita across ethnic homelands, based on the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira 
(GREG) in columns (1)-(3) and on the Ethnologue in columns (4)-(6). The overall spatial inequality index (Gini coefficient) captures the 
degree of spatial inequality across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes intersected by national boundaries and 
the coastline are of smaller size). For the construction of the ethnic and the spatial inequality measures (Gini coefficients) in columns (1) 
and (4) we use all ethnic (linguistic) homelands (and pixels); in columns (2) and (5) we exclude ethnic areas (and pixels) where capital 
cities fall; in columns (3) and (6) we exclude polygons (linguistic, ethnic, boxes) with less than one percent of a country’s population. 
Section 2 gives details on the construction of the ethnic inequality and spatial inequality (Gini) indexes. In all specifications we control 
for ethnic/linguistic fragmentation using indicators reflecting the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will not 
be members of the same group (the ethnic fragmentation index in (1)-(3) comes from Alesina et al. (2003) and the linguistic 
fragmentation index in (4)-(6) comes from Desmet et al. (2013)). In all specifications we include as controls log land area and log 
population in 2000 (simple set of controls), a measure of terrain ruggedness, the percentage of each country with fertile soil, the 
percentage of each country with tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, and an index of gem-quality diamond 
extraction (geographic set of controls). All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix 
gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Ethnologue
Table 4 -Ethnic Inequality and Economic Development (in 2000)
Additional Controls and Alternative Measures of Ethnic Inequality
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
Unconditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Admin Unit Inequality -1.6717*** -1.0139** -1.0185** -1.5074*** -1.2651*** -1.0080** -1.0150** -1.5177*** -1.2752***
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.4004)  (0.4188)  (0.4230)  (0.4096)  (0.4307)  (0.4446)  (0.4486)  (0.4333)  (0.4494)
Ethnic Inequality -1.0252*** -1.0401*** -1.0478*** -0.8087** -0.8527*** -0.8280*** -0.7952** -0.6096**
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.2611)  (0.2765)  (0.3557)  (0.3197)  (0.2487)  (0.2856)  (0.3158)  (0.2941)
   
0.0584 -0.0206 0.1337 -0.0548 -0.1103 0.0239
 (0.3479)  (0.3387)  (0.3062)  (0.2783)  (0.2736)  (0.2572)
Adjusted R-squared 0.642 0.667 0.665 0.686 0.741 0.667 0.665 0.686 0.738
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Conrols No No No No Yes No No No Yes
Table 5 - Ethnic Inequality, Administrative Unit Inequality and Economic Development
Panel A: Inequality across Administrative Units (1st-level)
EthnologueAtlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
Ethnic/Linguistic Fragmentation
Unconditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Admin Unit Inequality -0.6095* -0.1579 -0.1713 -1.0886*** -0.6976* -0.2834 -0.3099 -1.1967*** -0.7995**
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3391)  (0.3421)  (0.3409)  (0.3572)  (0.3675)  (0.3518)  (0.3535)  (0.3627)  (0.3482)
Ethnic Inequality -1.1068*** -1.0495*** -1.0863*** -0.7882** -0.7086** -0.6176* -0.8881*** -0.6873**
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.3315)  (0.3346)  (0.3812)  (0.3445)  (0.2974)  (0.3323)  (0.3389)  (0.3415)
-0.2237 -0.5142 0.025 -0.1827 -0.2027 0.0599
 (0.4018)  (0.3772)  (0.3514)  (0.3207)  (0.2937)  (0.2557)
Adjusted R-squared 0.677 0.698 0.696 0.726 0.773 0.692 0.690 0.723 0.773
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Conrols No No No No Yes No No No Yes
The table (both panels A and B) reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini coefficients reflect 
inequality in lights per capita across ethnic homelands, based on the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (2)-(5) and on the Ethnologue in columns 
(6)-(9). The administrative unit Gini index reflects inequality in lights per capita across administrative regions. In Panel A we use first-level administrative units. In Pane B we 
use second-level administrative units. Section 2 gives details on the construction of the ethnic inequality and spatial inequality (Gini) indexes. In specifications (3)-(5) and (7)-(9) 
we control for ethnic/linguistic fragmentation using indicators reflecting the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will not be members of the same 
group (the ethnic fragmentation index in (3)-(5) comes from Alesina et al. (2003) and the linguistic fragmentation index in (7)-(9) comes from Desmet et al. (2013)). 
Specifications (4), (5), (8), and (9) include as controls log land area and log population in 2000 (simple set of controls). Specifications (5) and (10) include as controls a measure 
of terrain ruggedness, the percentage of each country with fertile soil, the percentage of each country with tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, and an 
index of gem-quality diamond extraction (geographic set of controls). All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Table 5 - Ethnic Inequality, Administrative Unit Inequality and Economic Development
Panel B: Inequality across Administrative Units (2nd-level)
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Ethnic/Linguistic Fragmentation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ethnic Inequality -0.9510* -0.9566* -0.8652* -0.9276**  -1.4389*** -1.4365*** -1.2413*** -0.8063*
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.5004)  (0.5074)  (0.5174)  (0.4383)   (0.4075)  (0.4115)  (0.4159)  (0.4166)
Perturbed Ethnic Inequality -0.5371 -0.5457 -0.8223 -0.2645  0.3302 0.3376 0.0259 -0.1845
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.5258)  (0.5262)  (0.5469)  (0.4829)   (0.4640)  (0.4718)  (0.4950)  (0.4410)
0.0446 -0.0107 0.1614  -0.0213 -0.0147 0.1510
 (0.3521)  (0.3498)  (0.3159)   (0.2962)  (0.2962)  (0.2656)
Adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.652 0.662 0.721  0.653 0.650 0.657 0.718
Observations 173 173 173 173  173 173 173 173
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Conrols No No No Yes No No No Yes
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini 
coefficients reflect inequality in lights per capita across ethnic homelands, based on the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira 
(GREG) in columns (1)-(4) and on the Ethnologue in columns (5)-(8). The perturbed ethnic inequality measures (Gini coefficients) capture 
the degree of spatial inequality across Thiessen polygons in each country that use as input points the centroids of the ethnic-linguistic 
homelands according to the Atlas Narodov Mira (in columns (1)-(4)) and to the Ethnologue (in columns (5)-(8)). Thiessen polygons have 
the unique property that each polygon contains only one input point, and any location within a polygon is closer to its associated point than 
to a point of any other polygon. In specifications (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) we control for ethnic/linguistic fragmentation using indicators reflecting 
the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals in one country will not be members of the same group (the ethnic fragmentation index 
in (2)-(4) comes from Alesina et al. (2003) and the linguistic fragmentation index in (6)-(8) comes from Desmet et al. (2013)). 
Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) include as controls log land area and log population in 2000 (simple set of controls). Specifications (4) 
and (8) include as controls an index of terrain ruggedness, the percentage of each country with fertile soil, the percentage of each country 
with tropical climate, average distance to nearest ice-free coast, and an index of gem-quality diamond extraction (geographic set of 
controls). All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Ethnic Inequality and Development 
Conditioning on Perturbed Ethnic Homelands 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Ethnic/Linguistic 
Fragmentation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Quality 0.3035** -0.0077 -0.0918 0.184 0.4042*** 0.1913 0.4271** 0.3930***
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.1348)  (0.2191)  (0.1864) (0.1414) (0.1132) (0.1784)  (0.1924) (0.1230)
Temperature 1.651 -9.1956 7.3784 3.0874 19.5600*** 47.6529*** 39.7024*** 36.8859***
  [Gini Coeff.]  (7.2462)  (11.1686)  (10.7068)  (8.0507)  (6.8608)  (12.3794) (10.6988) (10.1117)
Precipitation 0.3421* 0.7845* 0.7969** 0.2916 0.1884 0.5606 0.3762 0.2878
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.2034)  (0.4227)  (0.3445)  (0.2259)  (0.2636)  (0.4862)  (0.4119)  (0.2620)
Distance to the Coast 0.2852** 0.3954** 0.1589 0.4640*** 0.1433 0.1819 0.0012 0.3462** 
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.1123)  (0.1801)  (0.1631)  (0.1458)  (0.1388)  (0.1659)  (0.1994)  (0.1332)
Elevation 0.5002* 0.6844** 0.9012*** 0.3019 0.4413*** 0.3449 0.6396*** -0.0356
  [Gini Coeff.]  (0.2674)  (0.3255)  (0.3064)  (0.2772)  (0.1584)  (0.2232)  (0.2013)  (0.1601)
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 0.467 0.493 0.491 0.583 0.611 0.617 0.667
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Spatial Admin Unit Levels No Spatial Admin Unit Levels
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with inequality in geographic endowments 
across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic-
linguistic homelands, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in (1)-(4) and Ethnologue in (5)-(8). To construct the 
inequality measures in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands we first estimate the distance from the centroid of each ethnic 
homeland to the closest sea coast, average elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture and then construct Gini 
coefficients capturing inequality across ethnic homelands in each of these geographic features for each country. In columns (2) and (6) we 
control for the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments using the Gini coefficient of each of these features (distance to 
the closest sea-coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature and land quality for agriculture) estimated across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree 
boxes/pixels in each country (boxes intersected by national boundaries and the coastline are of smaller size). In columns (3) and (7) we 
control for the regional inequality across administrative units in geographic endowments using the Gini coefficient of each of these features 
(distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature and land quality for agriculture) estimated across first-level administrative units 
in each country.  Columns (4) and (8) include as controls the mean values (for each country) of distance to sea coast, elevation, 
precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The 
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 7. On the Origins of Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Eigenvalue Variable 1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 4th PC 5th PC
1st Principal Comp 2.982 0.596 Gini Land Quality 0.460 -0.133 -0.572 0.647 -0.159
2nd Principal Comp 0.844 0.169 Gini Temperature 0.482 -0.358 0.388 0.097 0.693
3rd Principal Comp 0.746 0.149 Gini Precipitation 0.485 0.025 -0.463 -0.741 0.038
4th Principal Comp 0.251 0.050 Gini Sea Distance 0.297 0.918 0.143 0.145 0.167
5th Principal Comp 0.177 0.035 Gini Elevation 0.482 -0.106 0.536 -0.058 -0.682
1st Principal Comp 2.942 0.588 Gini Land Quality 0.432 -0.423 0.585 0.496 -0.215
2nd Principal Comp 1.062 0.213 Gini Temperature 0.448 -0.305 -0.688 0.319 0.362
3rd Principal Comp 0.551 0.110 Gini Precipitation 0.505 -0.250 0.183 -0.781 0.201
4th Principal Comp 0.260 0.052 Gini Sea Distance 0.353 0.710 0.274 0.196 0.509
5th Principal Comp 0.184 0.037 Gini Elevation 0.484 0.403 -0.275 -0.067 -0.724
1st Principal Comp 2.711 0.542 Gini Land Quality 0.482 -0.444 0.259 0.118 0.700
2nd Principal Comp 1.149 0.230 Gini Temperature 0.476 -0.060 -0.678 0.519 -0.203
3rd Principal Comp 0.629 0.126 Gini Precipitation 0.497 -0.350 0.360 -0.281 -0.650
4th Principal Comp 0.313 0.063 Gini Sea Distance 0.306 0.677 0.504 0.439 -0.042
5th Principal Comp 0.199 0.040 Gini Elevation 0.448 0.468 -0.301 -0.667 0.212
1st Principal Comp 2.314 0.463 Gini Land Quality 0.484 -0.414 0.428 -0.084 0.637
2nd Principal Comp 1.270 0.254 Gini Temperature 0.482 -0.063 -0.640 0.586 0.100
3rd Principal Comp 0.771 0.154 Gini Precipitation 0.574 -0.200 0.253 -0.089 -0.748
4th Principal Comp 0.403 0.081 Gini Sea Distance 0.181 0.717 0.492 0.455 0.059
5th Principal Comp 0.242 0.048 Gini Elevation 0.415 0.520 -0.318 -0.659 0.150
The table reports the results of the principal component analysis that is based on five measures (Gini coefficients) reflecting inequality in 
geographic endowments in distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture across 
ethnic/linguistic homelands (Panels A and B), pixels of 2.5 x 2.5 decimal degrees (in Panel C), and first-level administrative regions (in 
Panel D). Column (1) reports the eigenvalue of each principal component and column (2) gives the percentage of the total variance 
explained by each principal component. The other columns give the factor loadings for each of the five principal components.
Panel C: Gini Coefficient - Spatial Inequality Index
Panel D: Gini Coefficient - Administrative Unit Inequality
Factor Loadings
Table 8 - Principal Component Analysis. Inequality in Geographic Endowments
Variance 
Explained
Panel A: Gini Coefficient GREG - All Groups
Panel B: Gini Coefficient ETHNOLOGUE - All Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0902*** 0.1053*** 0.1077*** 0.0898*** 0.1210*** 0.1458*** 0.1595*** 0.1181***
(0.0101) (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.0123)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0102] [0.0192] [0.0196] [0.0108] [0.0118] [0.0200] [0.0192] [0.0124]
-0.0195 -0.0332*
(0.0201) (0.0195)                
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0200] [0.01984]
-0.0251 -0.0569***
(0.0210) (0.0185)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0214] [0.0195]
Adjusted R-squared 0.452 0.453 0.456 0.483 0.587 0.594 0.608 0.656
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Levels No No No Levels
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary ethnic inequality with inequality in geographic endowments across 
ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the ethnic Gini coefficient that reflects inequality in lights per capita across ethnic/linguistic 
homelands, using the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in (1)-(4) and Ethnologue in (5)-(8). The composite index of 
inequality in geographic endowments is the first principal component of five inequality measures (Gini coefficients) measuring inequality 
across ethnic/linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. The 
mapping of ethnic homelands follows the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (1)-(4) and of Ethnologue in 
columns (5)-(8). Columns (2) and (6) include a composite index reflecting the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic 
endowments. The composite index aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in 
each country (boxes/pixels intersected by national boundaries and the coastline are of smaller size) of distance to the coast, elevation, 
precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. Columns (3) and (7) include a composite index reflecting regional inequality in 
geographic endowments across administrative units. The composite index aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients across 
first-level administrative units in distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. Columns (4) 
and (8) include as controls the mean values (for each country) of distance to sea coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality 
for agriculture. All specifications include regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in the first-row below the estimates. In the second-row 
below the estimates we also report bootstrap standard errors that account for the use of a generated (principal component) regressor. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Inequality in Geography across 
Administrative Units (PC)
Table 9: On the Origins of Contemporary Ethnic Inequality
 Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Ethnic Inequality 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Inequality in Geography across 
Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geography 
(PC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.1347***-0.2087*** -0.1610** -0.0993*** -0.1293*** -0.1687** -0.1324** -0.1119***
(0.0383) (0.0754) (0.0695) (0.0367) (0.0432) (0.0708) (0.0659) (0.0364)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0387] [0.0758] [0.0709] [0.0389] [0.0432] [0.0717] [0.0675] [0.0379]
0.0954 0.0527
(0.0854) (0.0737)                 
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0855] [0.0749]
0.0375 0.0045
(0.0903) (0.0764)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0907] [0.0776]
Adjusted R-squared 0.635 0.636 0.633 0.691 0.633 0.632 0.630 0.696
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Levels No No No Levels
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary development with inequality in geographic endowments across 
ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The composite index of inequality in geographic 
endowments is the first principal component of five inequality measures (Gini coefficients) measuring inequality across ethnic/linguistic 
homelands in distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. The mapping of ethnic homelands 
follows the digitized version of Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (1)-(4) and of Ethnologue in columns (5)-(8). Columns (2) and (6) 
include a composite index reflecting the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments. The composite index aggregates 
(via principal components) Gini coefficients across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes/pixels intersected by 
national boundaries and the coastline are of smaller size) of distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for 
agriculture. Columns (3) and (7) include a composite index reflecting regional inequality in geographic endowments across administrative 
units. The composite index aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients across first-level administrative units in distance to the 
coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. Columns (4) and (8) include as controls the mean values (for 
each country) of distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. All specifications include 
regional fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses in the first-row below the estimates. In the second-row below the estimates we also report bootstrap 
standard errors that account for the use of a generated (principal component) regressor. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Ethnologue
Inequality in Geography across 
Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Spatial Inequality in Geography 
(PC)
Inequality in Geography across 
Administrative Units (PC)
Table 10: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands and Contemporary Development 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-1.2984***-1.2673***-1.2959*** -1.0602*** -1.1603*** -1.1505*** -1.2258*** -0.7805** 
(0.3685) (0.3601) (0.3650) (0.3440) (0.3326) (0.3320) (0.3391) (0.3294)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.3732] [0.3646] [0.3730] [0.3491] [0.3342] [0.3363] [0.3444] [0.3387]
-0.0177 -0.0753 -0.0214 -0.0041 0.011 -0.001 0.0632 -0.0197
(0.0495) (0.0719) (0.0661) (0.0455) (0.0560) (0.0752) (0.0737) (0.0552)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0502] [0.0735] [0.0694] [0.0470] [0.0562] [0.0769] [0.0770] [0.0563]
               
0.0707 0.0145
(0.0803) (0.0665)                
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0812] [0.0688]                
0.005 -0.0653
(0.0804) (0.0694)
  bootstrap s.e. [0.0822] [0.0719]
Adjusted R-squared 0.663 0.662 0.660 0.707 0.662 0.660 0.661 0.705
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Levels No No No Levels
The table reports cross-country OLS estimates, associating contemporary development with ethnic inequality and inequality in geographic 
endowments across ethnic homelands. The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita in 2000. The ethnic Gini coefficients reflect 
inequality in lights per capita across ethnic homelands, based on the digitized version of the Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (1)-(4) 
and based on the Ethnologue in columns (5)-(8). The composite index of inequality in geographic endowments is the first principal 
component of five inequality measures (Gini coefficients) measuring inequality across ethnic/linguistic homelands in distance to the coast, 
elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. The mapping of ethnic homelands follows the digitized version of 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) in columns (1)-(4) and of Ethnologue in columns (5)-(8). Columns (2) and (6) include a composite index 
reflecting the overall degree of spatial inequality in geographic endowments. The composite index aggregates (via principal components) 
Gini coefficients across 2.5 by 2.5 decimal degree boxes/pixels in each country (boxes/pixels intersected by national boundaries and the 
coastline are of smaller size) in distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. Columns (3) and 
(7) include a composite index reflecting regional inequality in geographic endowments across administrative units. The composite index 
aggregates (via principal components) Gini coefficients across first-level administrative units in distance to the coast, elevation, 
precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. Columns (4) and (8) include as controls the mean values (for each country) of 
distance to the coast, elevation, precipitation, temperature, and land quality for agriculture. All specifications include regional fixed effects 
(constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses in the first-row below the estimates. In the second-row below the estimates we also report bootstrap standard errors that account 
for the use of a generated (principal component) regressor. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Spatial Inequality in Geography 
(PC)
Inequality in Geography across 
Admininstrative Units (PC)
Inequality in Geography across 
Ethnic Homelands (PC)
Table 11: Inequality in Geographic Endowments across Ethnic Homelands, Ethnic Inequality, and 
Contemporary Development 
Atlas Narodov Mira (GREG) Ethnologue
Ethnic Inequality (Development)
